The current era is characterized by the proliferation of regional trade agreements around the world.
In light of the slow progress made to conclude the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), an avalanche of bilateral and regional free trade agreements will fill in the vacuum.
Arab countries have embarked upon ambitious continental integration efforts designed to fulfill their developmental goals.
The principles surrounding Arab economics, their economic integration focus, are the same as for any regional integration: combining the resources of constituent members in an effort to achieve economies of scale, comparative advantages, and development.
Arab countries have had several sub-continental regional arrangements for years.
However, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is generally regarded as a success, insofar as its incarnations as a free trade area, a customs union, and a common market are concerned.
The outcome of the GCC is still an unfolding drama of integration.
The GCC was established in May of 1981.
The GCC consists of six member states: (1) United Arab Emirates; (2) Bahrain; (3) Saudi Arabia; (4) Oman; (5) Kuwait; and (6) Qatar.
Structurally, the GCC is helped along by the fact that it has a manageable number of states and a high level of development.
The GCC countries have large markets and prosperous economies.
Engaging in a process of economic integration between countries with similar economic and development levels make the process easier as no wide economic gap exists between such countries.
In sum, GCC members share an already existent common identity and cohesion.
The signing of GCC Charter envisioned a closer economic relationship between member states.
The aim of the GCC was to promote cooperation in all fields of economic activity in order to increase and maintain economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members, and contributing to the progress and development of the Gulf region.
The other founding documents that established the GCC, its main organizations, and its executive procedures are the Supreme Council Rules of Procedure, the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure, and the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Rules of Procedure.
The GCC governing structure is composed of the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council, the Secretariat-General, and the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
These entities have the authority to establish any sub-agencies when necessary.
The Supreme Council is the most powerful GCC institution.
It is the head of the GCC governance structure.
The Supreme Council is composed of the head of each of the member states.
Its presidency rotates among the member states in alphabetical order.
The Supreme Council meets annually and the validity of any of its meetings is dependent upon the attendance of two-thirds of the member states.
The Supreme Council is the principal legislative body of the GCC and authorizes the other GCC entities to implement its decisions in pursuit of its mandate to realize the objectives of the GCC.
For example, the Supreme Council has the power to amend the Charter.
In addition, the Supreme Council reviews matters of interest to the member states, establishes the higher policy for the GCC, reviews the recommendations and reports submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval, reviews the reports prepared by the Secretary-General, approves the bases for dealing with other states and international organizations, nominates the members of the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes, and appoints the Secretary-General.
The voting of the Supreme Council decides whether or not a particular resolution is to be adopted and thus become binding on the member states.
In the Supreme Council, each member has one vote.
The Charter divides the voting into two kinds, substantive matters and procedural matters.
On the one hand, substantive matters must be approved by consensus.
In other words, a particular decision is adopted if each and every member state does not veto that decision.
The rationale for dividing matters into substantive and procedural indicates that the stakes are high with substantive matters- such as admitting new members into GCC, amending the GCC Charter, and appointing the Secretary-General- and as such are subject to consensus decision-making.
The Ministerial Council is composed of the foreign ministers of the member states or other designated Ministers.
In other words, delegates from the appropriate ministries may attend depending upon the issue at hand.
The Ministerial Council convenes regular meetings every three months, but it can also convene extraordinary meetings based on an invitation by one of the member states.
Like the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council's meetings are considered valid if attended by two-thirds of the member states.
The powers of the Ministerial Council are more detailed than those of the Supreme Council.
These powers include proposing policies, preparing recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination between member states in various fields; endeavoring to encourage, develop, and coordinate activities existing between member states in all fields; developing existing cooperation between member states' industry and Chambers of Commerce, and encouraging the movement of workers who are citizens of the member states within the GCC; and reviewing matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.
In summation, in terms of power, the Ministerial Council can actually make its own decisions but in other cases can be subject to superior approval.
Voting in the Ministerial Council is addressed in both the Charter and the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure.
Like the Supreme Council, each member in the Ministerial Council has one vote.
Again both agreements divide voting into two categories, substantive matters and procedural matters.
Like the voting rules for the Supreme Council, resolutions on substantive matters must be approved unanimously and resolutions on procedural matters must be approved by the majority.
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However, unlike the voting rules for the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure explicitly gives it the authority to resolve the issue of substantive and procedural.
The Secretariat is composed of a Secretary General and other necessary assistants and staff members.
The Secretary General should be a citizen of the GCC and is appointed by the Supreme Council for a period of three years, which may only be renewed once.
The number of professional civil servants who work in the GCC Secretariat remains unclear.
However, one anticipates that the Secretariat consists of primarily trade economists and trade lawyers.
One of the most important aspect of the GCC's governance structure is the dispute settlement body and process.
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For example, the dispute settlement body can declare an act of imposing tariffs, to appease domestic industry, on imports by a GCC member invalid if the act runs counter to the obligation of eliminating tariffs and other barriers under the GCC agreements.
If the dispute settlement body is seen as independent and able to ascertain its power, this will engender confidence in an integration scheme.
In the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) integration example, panels played an important role in strengthening the free trade area.
The binding rulings of NAFTA panels helped clarify valid regulations and policies of member states, and they set aside those that did not conform to the obligation to liberalize trade.
The GCC Charter establishes the Commission for Settlement of Disputes (Commission).
The Commission is composed of at least three citizens of the member states.
Panelists of the Commission are not appointed full-time or permanent; rather they are selected on an ad hoc basis.
As presently drafted, the Charter does not provide any guidelines for the selection of panelists of the Commission in terms of their qualifications, age, or years of expertise in the area of trade law, policy, or economics either in the domestic or international arena.
Additionally, the Charter does not indicate whether panelists of the Commission would be expected to act in their governmental capacity or neutrally.
The Commission has jurisdiction to consider matters referred to it by the Supreme Council regarding disputes between member states as well as disputes over the interpretation and implementation of the Charter.
Therefore, a Member State may bring an action before the Commission alleging the failure of another member State to fulfill the obligations of the Charter, and in these matters the Commission has original jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the Commission may also extend to review decisions or actions of the Supreme Council or the Ministerial Council for consistency with the Charter.
However, the ability of the Commission to hear disputes between Member States depends upon discretionary and consensus "referral" by the Supreme Council.
Moreover, neither the Charter nor the Rules of Procedure of the Commission have any provision for individual access, direct or otherwise, to the Commission.
Another problematic issue is that the Charter is silent about situations where the actions or domestic law of a particular Member State - while not in violation of the GCC agreement - may nevertheless inadvertently contradict or nullify the purposes of the agreement.
At any rate, the ultimate authority of the Commission is a subject for future observation and certainly a strong argument can be made for adopting these concepts at some point in the future.
Regarding the recommendations and opinions issued by the Commission, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission set out four guiding points for such recommendations.
First, the recommendations or opinions should be in accordance with the Charter, international laws and practices, and the principles of Islamic Shariah.
Second, the Commission, while considering any dispute and before issuing the final recommendation, may ask the Supreme Council to take an interim action called for by circumstances.
Third, the Commission should justify its recommendations by specifying the reasons on which they were based.
Finally, if the opinion is not issued unanimously, the dissenting members are entitled to record their dissenting opinion.
The Commission's task is considered to be completed upon the submission of its recommendations or opinions to the Supreme Council.
The Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Commission do not include any language for an appellate review process.
The Charter and Rules of Procedure do not discuss the scope of the "appellate review" in terms of factual matters, legal substance, or the rules and nature of its proceedings.
In other words, there is no framework for the appellate review in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.
Model Rules of Procedures should be developed to determine the number of panelists, their qualifications, expertise, nationality, and remuneration.
Model rules of procedures may include policies, practices, and procedures for receiving initial and rebuttal written submissions, how oral hearings will be conducted before a panel, and mandatory time limits for each step.
The dispute settlement should call for increased transparency in proceedings, in particular the opening up of panel hearings to the public.
In regards to the presentation of confidential business information in the panel proceedings, portions of any dispute hearing dealing with such confidential information would not be open to the public.
In light of the slow progress made to conclude the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), an avalanche of bilateral and regional free trade agreements will fill in the vacuum.
Arab countries have embarked upon ambitious continental integration efforts designed to fulfill their developmental goals.
The principles surrounding Arab economics, their economic integration focus, are the same as for any regional integration: combining the resources of constituent members in an effort to achieve economies of scale, comparative advantages, and development.
Arab countries have had several sub-continental regional arrangements for years.
However, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is generally regarded as a success, insofar as its incarnations as a free trade area, a customs union, and a common market are concerned.
The outcome of the GCC is still an unfolding drama of integration.
The GCC was established in May of 1981.
The GCC consists of six member states: (1) United Arab Emirates; (2) Bahrain; (3) Saudi Arabia; (4) Oman; (5) Kuwait; and (6) Qatar.
Structurally, the GCC is helped along by the fact that it has a manageable number of states and a high level of development.
The GCC countries have large markets and prosperous economies.
Engaging in a process of economic integration between countries with similar economic and development levels make the process easier as no wide economic gap exists between such countries.
In sum, GCC members share an already existent common identity and cohesion.
The signing of GCC Charter envisioned a closer economic relationship between member states.
The aim of the GCC was to promote cooperation in all fields of economic activity in order to increase and maintain economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members, and contributing to the progress and development of the Gulf region.
The other founding documents that established the GCC, its main organizations, and its executive procedures are the Supreme Council Rules of Procedure, the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure, and the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Rules of Procedure.
The GCC governing structure is composed of the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council, the Secretariat-General, and the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
These entities have the authority to establish any sub-agencies when necessary.
The Supreme Council is the most powerful GCC institution.
It is the head of the GCC governance structure.
The Supreme Council is composed of the head of each of the member states.
Its presidency rotates among the member states in alphabetical order.
The Supreme Council meets annually and the validity of any of its meetings is dependent upon the attendance of two-thirds of the member states.
The Supreme Council is the principal legislative body of the GCC and authorizes the other GCC entities to implement its decisions in pursuit of its mandate to realize the objectives of the GCC.
For example, the Supreme Council has the power to amend the Charter.
In addition, the Supreme Council reviews matters of interest to the member states, establishes the higher policy for the GCC, reviews the recommendations and reports submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval, reviews the reports prepared by the Secretary-General, approves the bases for dealing with other states and international organizations, nominates the members of the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes, and appoints the Secretary-General.
The voting of the Supreme Council decides whether or not a particular resolution is to be adopted and thus become binding on the member states.
In the Supreme Council, each member has one vote.
The Charter divides the voting into two kinds, substantive matters and procedural matters.
On the one hand, substantive matters must be approved by consensus.
In other words, a particular decision is adopted if each and every member state does not veto that decision.
The rationale for dividing matters into substantive and procedural indicates that the stakes are high with substantive matters- such as admitting new members into GCC, amending the GCC Charter, and appointing the Secretary-General- and as such are subject to consensus decision-making.
The Ministerial Council is composed of the foreign ministers of the member states or other designated Ministers.
In other words, delegates from the appropriate ministries may attend depending upon the issue at hand.
The Ministerial Council convenes regular meetings every three months, but it can also convene extraordinary meetings based on an invitation by one of the member states.
Like the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council's meetings are considered valid if attended by two-thirds of the member states.
The powers of the Ministerial Council are more detailed than those of the Supreme Council.
These powers include proposing policies, preparing recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination between member states in various fields; endeavoring to encourage, develop, and coordinate activities existing between member states in all fields; developing existing cooperation between member states' industry and Chambers of Commerce, and encouraging the movement of workers who are citizens of the member states within the GCC; and reviewing matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.
In summation, in terms of power, the Ministerial Council can actually make its own decisions but in other cases can be subject to superior approval.
Voting in the Ministerial Council is addressed in both the Charter and the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure.
Like the Supreme Council, each member in the Ministerial Council has one vote.
Again both agreements divide voting into two categories, substantive matters and procedural matters.
Like the voting rules for the Supreme Council, resolutions on substantive matters must be approved unanimously and resolutions on procedural matters must be approved by the majority.
.
However, unlike the voting rules for the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure explicitly gives it the authority to resolve the issue of substantive and procedural.
The Secretariat is composed of a Secretary General and other necessary assistants and staff members.
The Secretary General should be a citizen of the GCC and is appointed by the Supreme Council for a period of three years, which may only be renewed once.
The number of professional civil servants who work in the GCC Secretariat remains unclear.
However, one anticipates that the Secretariat consists of primarily trade economists and trade lawyers.
One of the most important aspect of the GCC's governance structure is the dispute settlement body and process.
.
For example, the dispute settlement body can declare an act of imposing tariffs, to appease domestic industry, on imports by a GCC member invalid if the act runs counter to the obligation of eliminating tariffs and other barriers under the GCC agreements.
If the dispute settlement body is seen as independent and able to ascertain its power, this will engender confidence in an integration scheme.
In the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) integration example, panels played an important role in strengthening the free trade area.
The binding rulings of NAFTA panels helped clarify valid regulations and policies of member states, and they set aside those that did not conform to the obligation to liberalize trade.
The GCC Charter establishes the Commission for Settlement of Disputes (Commission).
The Commission is composed of at least three citizens of the member states.
Panelists of the Commission are not appointed full-time or permanent; rather they are selected on an ad hoc basis.
As presently drafted, the Charter does not provide any guidelines for the selection of panelists of the Commission in terms of their qualifications, age, or years of expertise in the area of trade law, policy, or economics either in the domestic or international arena.
Additionally, the Charter does not indicate whether panelists of the Commission would be expected to act in their governmental capacity or neutrally.
The Commission has jurisdiction to consider matters referred to it by the Supreme Council regarding disputes between member states as well as disputes over the interpretation and implementation of the Charter.
Therefore, a Member State may bring an action before the Commission alleging the failure of another member State to fulfill the obligations of the Charter, and in these matters the Commission has original jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the Commission may also extend to review decisions or actions of the Supreme Council or the Ministerial Council for consistency with the Charter.
However, the ability of the Commission to hear disputes between Member States depends upon discretionary and consensus "referral" by the Supreme Council.
Moreover, neither the Charter nor the Rules of Procedure of the Commission have any provision for individual access, direct or otherwise, to the Commission.
Another problematic issue is that the Charter is silent about situations where the actions or domestic law of a particular Member State - while not in violation of the GCC agreement - may nevertheless inadvertently contradict or nullify the purposes of the agreement.
At any rate, the ultimate authority of the Commission is a subject for future observation and certainly a strong argument can be made for adopting these concepts at some point in the future.
Regarding the recommendations and opinions issued by the Commission, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission set out four guiding points for such recommendations.
First, the recommendations or opinions should be in accordance with the Charter, international laws and practices, and the principles of Islamic Shariah.
Second, the Commission, while considering any dispute and before issuing the final recommendation, may ask the Supreme Council to take an interim action called for by circumstances.
Third, the Commission should justify its recommendations by specifying the reasons on which they were based.
Finally, if the opinion is not issued unanimously, the dissenting members are entitled to record their dissenting opinion.
The Commission's task is considered to be completed upon the submission of its recommendations or opinions to the Supreme Council.
The Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Commission do not include any language for an appellate review process.
The Charter and Rules of Procedure do not discuss the scope of the "appellate review" in terms of factual matters, legal substance, or the rules and nature of its proceedings.
In other words, there is no framework for the appellate review in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.
Model Rules of Procedures should be developed to determine the number of panelists, their qualifications, expertise, nationality, and remuneration.
Model rules of procedures may include policies, practices, and procedures for receiving initial and rebuttal written submissions, how oral hearings will be conducted before a panel, and mandatory time limits for each step.
The dispute settlement should call for increased transparency in proceedings, in particular the opening up of panel hearings to the public.
In regards to the presentation of confidential business information in the panel proceedings, portions of any dispute hearing dealing with such confidential information would not be open to the public.
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