Nearly a month ago, President Bush introduced a revised strategy for addressing the challenges confronting the United States in Iraq.
The strategy entailed the deployment of "more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq" and rested heavily on the assumption that the current Iraqi transitional government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki could be relied upon to take the steps necessary to disarm Iraq's sectarian militias and promote national reconciliation.
Notably absent from the strategy was any effort to undertake diplomatic engagement with Iraq's neighbors or to initiate a process that would lead to the formation of a truly representative national government in Iraq.
The latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released by the Director of National Intelligence has placed renewed focus on the new strategy's weaknesses.
At the same time, it expresses significant concerns over the course that events could take in Iraq over the next 12 to 18 months.
The NIE underscores the inherent danger of placing undue reliance on the Maliki government.
It warns that "given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the timeframe of this Estimate [12-18 months].
" Without national reconciliation, the sectarian strife could persist or worsen.
Maintaining or tightening existing Sunni economic and political disenfranchisement will likely push Iraq further down the violent path of fragmentation.
Yet, that may well be the likely evolution that events could take given the dynamics driving Iraq's situation.
The NIE explains that the Shia are "deeply insecure about their hold on power.
" This insecurity could lead to the effort to overreach and seek dominance.
Such an effort appears to be underway under the Maliki government.
Moreover, extremists are among the members of that government.
Representative of that issue is the presence of Jamal Jafaar Mohammed in the Parliament.
A Kuwaiti court sentenced Mohammed to death in 1984 for his role in the bombings of the U.
S.
and French embassies in December 1983.
Worse, Maliki's Dawa Party claimed responsibility for those bombings at the time, although it now distances itself from them.
Finally, earlier on February 8, Iraqi forces detained Deputy Health Minister Hakim al-Zamili, a supporter of Moqtada al-Sadr, whose Shia militia has played a prominent role in initiating and carrying out sectarian violence.
The bottom line: the Maliki government is not likely a reliable partner for the United States nor is it likely to transform itself into a party for national reconciliation.
The NIE also explains that many of Iraq's Sunnis "remain unwilling to accept their minority status, believe the central government is illegitimate and incompetent, and are convinced that Shia dominance will increase Iranian influence over Iraq, in ways that erode the state's Arab character and increase Sunni repression.
" Today, Iraq's Sunni community is increasingly disenfranchised, both politically and economically.
Moreover, even as it has show little inclination to undertake a meaningful course of national reconciliation, the Maliki government is regularly confirming Sunnis' worst fears by embracing leading Shia sectarian militias and building increasingly close ties with Iran.
The NIE also confirms the trend toward ethnic cleansing and notes that the ongoing "significant population displacement" suggests a "hardening of ethno-sectarian divisions.
" In short, Iraq is currently on a dangerous trajectory.
The added U.
S.
manpower is far insufficient to impose a military solution.
The absence of diplomacy limits the American ability to bring about the national reconciliation that will be key to stabilizing the situation in Iraq.
Later, the NIE lays out some developments that could improve the situation in Iraq.
These include "broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and federalism" and "significant concessions by Shia and Kurds to create space for Sunni acceptance of federalism.
" The current transitional government, barring a radical change in its composition and character, is not likely to bring about such outcomes.
Absence of U.
S.
diplomacy is also likely to reduce the already low prospect of such developments.
Finally, the NIE lays out three possible scenarios should the latest U.
S.
strategy fail.
First, chaos within Iraq could lead to a de facto partitioning of the country.
Such a development, according to the NIE, "would generate fierce violence for at least several years, ranging well beyond the timeframe of this Estimate, before settling into a partially stable end-state.
" Second, a "Shia strongman" could emerge.
That could lead to a new period of authoritarian rule.
Third, the country could fragment into anarchy.
That outcome could, in turn, have broader regional implications and, if the anarch spreads, it could destabilize the Middle East by exacerbating the slowly building Shia-Sunni rivalry.
In the end, the NIE offers a powerful case for addressing the serious flaws in the new U.
S.
strategy.
Unless those issues--the need to build a representative, inclusive, and responsive Iraqi government that is free of militia influence; disarming and dismantling of the sectarian militias; and aggressive diplomacy--are resolved, the new strategy may well help pave the way for the three scenarios set forth in the NIE.
None of those three scenarios would serve U.
S.
interests in the region or those of its Middle East allies.
The strategy entailed the deployment of "more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq" and rested heavily on the assumption that the current Iraqi transitional government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki could be relied upon to take the steps necessary to disarm Iraq's sectarian militias and promote national reconciliation.
Notably absent from the strategy was any effort to undertake diplomatic engagement with Iraq's neighbors or to initiate a process that would lead to the formation of a truly representative national government in Iraq.
The latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released by the Director of National Intelligence has placed renewed focus on the new strategy's weaknesses.
At the same time, it expresses significant concerns over the course that events could take in Iraq over the next 12 to 18 months.
The NIE underscores the inherent danger of placing undue reliance on the Maliki government.
It warns that "given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the timeframe of this Estimate [12-18 months].
" Without national reconciliation, the sectarian strife could persist or worsen.
Maintaining or tightening existing Sunni economic and political disenfranchisement will likely push Iraq further down the violent path of fragmentation.
Yet, that may well be the likely evolution that events could take given the dynamics driving Iraq's situation.
The NIE explains that the Shia are "deeply insecure about their hold on power.
" This insecurity could lead to the effort to overreach and seek dominance.
Such an effort appears to be underway under the Maliki government.
Moreover, extremists are among the members of that government.
Representative of that issue is the presence of Jamal Jafaar Mohammed in the Parliament.
A Kuwaiti court sentenced Mohammed to death in 1984 for his role in the bombings of the U.
S.
and French embassies in December 1983.
Worse, Maliki's Dawa Party claimed responsibility for those bombings at the time, although it now distances itself from them.
Finally, earlier on February 8, Iraqi forces detained Deputy Health Minister Hakim al-Zamili, a supporter of Moqtada al-Sadr, whose Shia militia has played a prominent role in initiating and carrying out sectarian violence.
The bottom line: the Maliki government is not likely a reliable partner for the United States nor is it likely to transform itself into a party for national reconciliation.
The NIE also explains that many of Iraq's Sunnis "remain unwilling to accept their minority status, believe the central government is illegitimate and incompetent, and are convinced that Shia dominance will increase Iranian influence over Iraq, in ways that erode the state's Arab character and increase Sunni repression.
" Today, Iraq's Sunni community is increasingly disenfranchised, both politically and economically.
Moreover, even as it has show little inclination to undertake a meaningful course of national reconciliation, the Maliki government is regularly confirming Sunnis' worst fears by embracing leading Shia sectarian militias and building increasingly close ties with Iran.
The NIE also confirms the trend toward ethnic cleansing and notes that the ongoing "significant population displacement" suggests a "hardening of ethno-sectarian divisions.
" In short, Iraq is currently on a dangerous trajectory.
The added U.
S.
manpower is far insufficient to impose a military solution.
The absence of diplomacy limits the American ability to bring about the national reconciliation that will be key to stabilizing the situation in Iraq.
Later, the NIE lays out some developments that could improve the situation in Iraq.
These include "broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and federalism" and "significant concessions by Shia and Kurds to create space for Sunni acceptance of federalism.
" The current transitional government, barring a radical change in its composition and character, is not likely to bring about such outcomes.
Absence of U.
S.
diplomacy is also likely to reduce the already low prospect of such developments.
Finally, the NIE lays out three possible scenarios should the latest U.
S.
strategy fail.
First, chaos within Iraq could lead to a de facto partitioning of the country.
Such a development, according to the NIE, "would generate fierce violence for at least several years, ranging well beyond the timeframe of this Estimate, before settling into a partially stable end-state.
" Second, a "Shia strongman" could emerge.
That could lead to a new period of authoritarian rule.
Third, the country could fragment into anarchy.
That outcome could, in turn, have broader regional implications and, if the anarch spreads, it could destabilize the Middle East by exacerbating the slowly building Shia-Sunni rivalry.
In the end, the NIE offers a powerful case for addressing the serious flaws in the new U.
S.
strategy.
Unless those issues--the need to build a representative, inclusive, and responsive Iraqi government that is free of militia influence; disarming and dismantling of the sectarian militias; and aggressive diplomacy--are resolved, the new strategy may well help pave the way for the three scenarios set forth in the NIE.
None of those three scenarios would serve U.
S.
interests in the region or those of its Middle East allies.
Source...